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Abstract

The purpose of this study was twofold: to capture the United States (US)
government’s revealed preference for air superiority using the hedonic pricing approach
(HPA) and compare the characteristics of United States Air Force (USAF) fighter aircraft
with those of the former Soviet Union to evaluate the effectiveness of the USAF fleet.
The resulting analysis showed that the US government is paying for physical and
performance characteristics such as engine thrust, service ceiling, range, and large scale
integrated circuit technology. However, evidence suggests the government is not paying
to have a relative advantage over the enemy based on the physical and performance
characteristics analyzed.
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BUYING A BETTER AIR FORCE

I. Introduction

Background
If we lose the war in the air, we lose the war and we lose it very quickly.
-Viscount Montgomery of Alamein
United States (US) fighter aircraft were called upon to secure the skies and
maintain air superiority as early as World War I. In recent years, the US government has
set a new and higher standard for airpower. Hallion (1999:4) states,
Today, wars typically start, are prosecuted, and reach their decisive
culminating point – whether surrender of a foe, agreement to a cease-fire,
or the ceasing of combat operations – thanks to air action. Given these
circumstances, to lose control of the air is to lose a war, particularly in an
era (as we now are in since the end of the Cold War) when deployable
overseas forces are small, and thus, particularly vulnerable to the
tremendous leverage an opponent gains by sudden and swift air attack.
As such, the goal now is to dominate the airspace over a battlefield and not just
overcome the enemy.
If the US does not have clear control of the air while fighting a nation that has
equivalent or near-equivalent forces, US military operations are constrained. Thus air
superiority forces must fight both defensively and offensively: ensuring “their own
survival before fulfilling whatever mission objectives they are trying to achieve”
(Hallion, 1999:4). Otherwise the dangers of parity air war are far reaching: potentially
affecting air, space, surface, sub-surface operations, and the home front. For example, a
shower of bombs and guided missiles from enemy bombers on a naval fleet can be
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devastating to US shipping operations. “Further, since damaged or sunken ships carry a
large price-tag of national prestige and, even worse, lives, the loss or damage of even a
single major vessel can have a shattering impact upon public opinion and resolve”
(Hallion, 1994:5).
Therefore, it is evident that the US needs to secure and maintain control of the air.
“Broadly speaking, control of the air enables a nation to prosecute the fullest range of
offensive operations by all its forces against a foe, while, at the same time, insulating
those forces defensively from meaningful enemy counterattacks” (Hallion, 1994:5).
Former Secretary William Perry suggested in the 1997 defense budget proposal that he
was willing to pay a premium to achieve this level of air superiority. To that end, the US
government has invested in advances in aircraft technology and training regimes, which
has led to impressive aircraft performance capabilities and skilled pilots, albeit
accompanied by rising costs.
Problem
The General Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the Department of
Defense (DoD) plans on “increasing future aircraft acquisition funding – sometimes
approaching Cold-War era spending levels” (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-103, 1997b: 3). It is
estimated that the Department of Defense will spend upwards of $31.7 billion in aircraft
procurement and research, test, and development efforts this year as seen in Figure 1.
With the controversial F/A-22 and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programs underway and
legacy aircraft systems growing older, becoming more difficult to maintain and relatively
less capable, a great deal of reports and research have addressed both the need and cost of
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modernization1. However, little research has been conducted concerning the benefits
modernization has provided and what the US government has been willing to pay for
these benefits; specifically, quantifying the construct of air superiority. This study can
assist decision makers within the Department of Defense to evaluate the effectiveness of
United States Air Force (USAF) fighter aircraft in an era where budget constraints force
them to work with limited resources. In a NASA Langley Research Center report,
Spearman states in reference to fighter aircraft characteristics and trends, “Questions that
may be asked—‘Are you getting what you are paying for?’ or ‘Do you need what you are
getting?’ are easily asked but, again, difficult to answer” (Spearman, 1984:6).

Figure 1. Military Aircraft Spending

The nation’s revealed preference for national defense or characteristics of national
defense are important but often ignored research questions. In this current acquisition

1

See, for example, GAO/NSIAD-97-77 (1997a), GAO-03-775 (2003), Hampton (1998), Browne (1998),
Spearman (1984), and Morehead (1973).
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environment, it is important for the DoD to understand and find answers for such
questions. In this study, revealed preference and hedonic pricing theory will aid in
evaluating the effectiveness and value of the USAF fleet.
Research Question
The purpose of this research is to capture the government’s revealed preference
for air superiority using the hedonic pricing approach (HPA). The US has been ever
vigilant in maintaining an asymmetric warfare advantage, especially in the arena of aerial
combat, where the advantage wholly and completely favors American forces to capitalize
on demonstrated capabilities and strengths. The combination of technically sophisticated
aircraft design, precise weapons systems, and superior training significantly increases the
chance of US military operation success. The sophistication of US fighter aircraft design
and capabilities in relation to emerging threat technologies is of particular interest in this
research. As mentioned earlier, the US government is willing to pay a premium to secure
and maintain control of the air, a premium that can be implicitly estimated using a nonmarket valuation method.
Investigative Questions (IQ)
This study will attempt to answer two questions: (1) What is the US government’s
revealed preference for ensuring airspace dominance? (2) Has the US government
purchased fighter aircraft that are inferior, superior, or comparable to threat technologies,
namely the former Soviet Union? Both of these questions speak to the historical value of
government demand for air superiority.

4

Summary of Current Knowledge
The Air Force Doctrine Document 1 outlines six distinctive capabilities that
“represent the combination of professional knowledge, air and space power expertise, and
technological fluency that, when applied, produces superior military capabilities or
effects” (DAF, 2003:76).

Distinctive Capabilities
Air and Space Superiority
Information Superiority
Global Attack
Precision Engagement
Rapid Global Mobility
Agile Combat Support
Figure 2. Distinctive Capabilities (DAF, 2003:76)

These distinctive capabilities are built upon air superiority, “the degree of
dominance that permits friendly land, sea, air, and space forces to operate at a given time
and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force,” (DAF, 2003:77) a
foundational concept critical for mission success.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in its assessment of US air superiority capability,
divided it into five distinct missions. Two missions involved offensive air
superiority operations to defeat enemy fighter aircraft and surface-to-air
defenses within enemy territory, and three involved defensive air
superiority to protect friendly territory against enemy aircraft, cruise
missiles, and theater ballistic missiles. (GAO/NSIAD-97-77, 1997a:19)
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Attain air superiority
Conduct offensive operations

Conduct defensive operations

Defeat enemy fighters

Defeat enemy aircraft

Defeat enemy surface-to-air defenses

Defeat enemy cruise missiles
Defeat enemy theater ballistic missiles

Figure 3. The Missions of Air Superiority (GAO/NSIAD-97-77, 1997a:5)

The DoD planned to “include over $43 billion from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year
2001 for the acquisition of systems dedicated to the air superiority mission” across all
defense services where “most of the planned funding was for the acquisition of aircraft to
defeat enemy aircraft, and defensive systems to defeat enemy theater ballistic missiles”
(GAO/NSIAD-97-77, 1997a:19). This research will investigate aircraft acquisitions
designed to combat enemy aircraft and will assess the value the US government has
placed on achieving air superiority.
Degrees of controlling air and space are possible, ranging from paralysis to
supremacy (Hallion, 1999:6). “Air paralysis typifies a nation unable to undertake
offensive military action of any significance because it is controlled by enemy air forces;
there is no hope of victory, and the enemy has air supremacy” (Hallion, 1996:6).
“Supremacy is that degree of superiority wherein opposing air and space forces are
incapable of effective interference anywhere in a given theater of operations” (DAF,
2003:77). During the Gulf War in 1991, US-led coalition forces enjoyed air supremacy,
however, “the coalition had seven months to deploy and build up forces before launching

6

its counteroffensive” (Hampton, 1998:6). Though the preferred degree of control is air
and space supremacy, as witnessed by the operations of the Gulf War, achieving air
supremacy exacts a high price. Therefore “superiority, even local or mission-specific
superiority, may provide sufficient freedom of action to accomplish assigned objectives”
(DAF, 2003:77). A RAND corporation study conducted in late 1993 concluded that “the
lesson from the Gulf War is not that the US has enough airpower to meet future needs but
that the capabilities exhibited in that war are a national asset that Washington should
preserve or extend” (Shaver and others, 1994:46-52).
Defense spending seems likely to grow the next few years, despite the high US
federal deficit, forecasted to amount around $521 billion this fiscal year. A key factor,
threats to US security, is “likely to remain high for several years, as we work to complete
our missions in Afghanistan and Iraq and as terrorists continue to pose threats to our
interests at home and abroad. The likelihood of a continued defense buildup is
heightened by administration plans that call for modest growth in the defense budget,
which makes it easier for Congress to support such growth even in the face of large
budget deficits” (Hale, 2004:26). A portion of the defense budget is allocated for fielding
weapons systems that secure US success in current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq,
deploying weapons systems for gaining air superiority in these combat zones, and the
modernization of systems for gaining and maintaining air superiority in hostile areas that
the US will oversee in the future. “Although air superiority missions have many
components, and many types of equipment are involved, the acquisition of US fighter
aircraft with the capability to defeat enemy fighters and other aircraft is expected to
consume about 47 percent of the resources planned for air superiority missions”
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(GAO/NSIAD-97-77, 1997a:21). With a large portion of defense spending for air
superiority missions dedicated to the acquisition of US fighter aircraft, it is crucial that
the DoD have adequate analytical support for making decisions about proceeding with
the acquisition of new tactical fighters or investing in modifications for current fighter
aircraft in the Air Force inventory.
Assumptions
Several assumptions are made in this research. First, an assumption was made
that only fighter aircraft are representative of the air superiority mission. Second, the
researcher assumes that the appropriate model is a hedonic pricing approach. Third, the
cost used for each US aircraft is the 100th unit flyaway cost. Some may argue that many
US aircraft platforms fought several enemy planes. So, a fourth and final assumption is
that each US aircraft will be compared to an enemy aircraft it was designed to combat.
This determination is made using historical background and coupling planes based on the
year the aircraft became operational.
Proposed Methodology
This research is accomplished using a hedonic pricing technique to produce a
model that incorporates historical characteristics of aircraft, such as payload, speed, and
aircraft costs, to approximate the premium the government has been willing to pay to
develop and maintain a formidable fleet of aircraft. This research will compare physical
and performance capabilities of both US and enemy aircraft. The data will be collected
from the Air Force Museum, Jane’s Defense database, various books from the Air Force
History Office, and Bill Gunston’s Osprey Encyclopedia of Russian Aircraft.
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Scope of Research
This research focuses on US fighter aircraft and their variants from the postWorld War II era to present, as well as combatant enemy aircraft built and flown by the
former Soviet Union. Only Air Force aircraft that have been fielded will be used in the
analysis. This research will address several characteristics for each plane. The number of
variables in the hedonic model will be limited to the number of data points, or US and
former USSR aircraft, that are available.

9

II. Literature Review

General Issue
To quote J.F.C. Fuller, a Major General in the British army, military historian,
and strategist,
It is absolutely true in war, were other things equal, that numbers –
whether men, shells, bombs, etc. – would be supreme. Yet it is also
absolutely true that other things are never equal and can never be equal.
There is always a difference, and it is the differences, which by begging to
differ so frequently throw all calculations to the winds. (Westenhoff,
1990:59)
J.F.C. Fuller summarized the art of war well. The difference that distinguishes
US military forces from other combat powers is its precise weapons systems and
sophisticated aircraft design2. The differences that J.F.C. Fuller speaks of will be
empirically derived using a revealed preference method called hedonics.
There is no question that the DoD has funded many efforts that support the air
superiority doctrine outlined for the USAF. An appreciable amount of money has been
allocated to the DoD for this purpose. As seen in Fig. 4, the real cost of aircraft has
increased substantially since the mid-1940s.

2

J.F.C. Fuller spoke also of planning, training, morale, etc., and not just technical supremacy.
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Figure 4. USAF Fighter Aircraft Total Flyaway Costs from 1946-1982

Problem Statement
Since the DoD’s expenditures cost millions of dollars for a single aircraft, it is
important to investigate if those dollars are well spent. The purpose of this research is
twofold: to determine the US’ revealed preference for air superiority and compare the
characteristics of USAF fighter aircraft with those of the former USSR to evaluate the
effectiveness the of the USAF fleet. As mentioned earlier, the US government has paid a
monetary premium to secure and maintain control of the air, a premium that can be
implicitly estimated using a non-market valuation method. This literature review will
discuss elements that constitute the use of non-market valuation methods, specifically the
revealed preference and hedonic pricing theories and a brief overview of other fighter
aircraft studies.
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Non-Market Valuation
Before the elements that constitute the use of non-market valuation methods are
discussed, it is important to have a basic understanding of related concepts and
terminology. The willingness of an individual or group to pay for a bundle of goods
commensurate with the level of utility, or satisfaction, received from these goods is
determined in two dimensions. The first dimension, “stated preference,” is where we use
surveys to ask people how much they are willing to pay. The aim of these surveys is to
have participants openly state their willingness to pay for a good or service for which a
market does not exist, like public goods3.
The second dimension, “revealed preference,” also involves choice data generated
from participants, but these choices are revealed through actions and recorded by an
observer (Adamowicz and others, 1997:66). Samuelson’s 1938 theory of revealed
preference has turned out to be foundational in non-market valuation research, where its
applications are used on larger and richer sets of data describing consumer behavior
(Varian, 2005:18).

3

A public good is a good that is non-rivalrous and non-excludable. A good is non-rivalrous when its
benefits fail to exhibit consumption scarcity such that once it is produced, everyone benefits without
diminishing other’s enjoyment. A good is non-excludable if it is not possible to prevent access to the good
once it is made available to the public. A public good, such as national defense, benefits society as a
whole.
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The application of revealed preference theory is outlined in the table below:
Table 1. Process of Estimating Values Using Revealed-Preference Methods (Boyle, 2003: 265)
Process of Estimating Values Using Revealed-Preference Methods
1

Identify change (s) in quantity or quality to be valued.

2

Identify population whose values are to be estimated.

3

Develop theoretical definition(s) of value(s) to be estimated.

4

Select revealed preference valuation methods.

5

Identify appropriate sources of secondary data.

6

Obtain secondary data and check the coding of the data.

7

Determine if any primary data are needed.

8

If primary data are needed, design survey instrument and collect the data.

9

Estimate model(s).

10

Derive welfare estimate(s) from estimated model(s).

Hedonic Pricing.
Hedonic pricing is one of four revealed preference valuation methods. The other
methods are travel cost, defensive behavior, and cost of illness. The hedonic pricing
method will be used in this study to capture quantitatively the demand for differentiated
goods, in this case USAF fighter aircraft.
Publicly provided amenities such as national defense or those provided by the
natural environment are frequently not priced in the market (Chattopadhyay, 2002:641).
Because goods that do not have market prices themselves can often affect the prices of
market goods, extensive research has been dedicated to determining their estimated
implicit prices (Lesser and others, 1997:276). The differences in the characteristics of
goods generate the differences in values, as well as consumers’ utility functions. Sherwin
Rosen is credited with the theory of hedonic prices (Rosen, 1974). A common example
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of hedonic theory suggests that the price of a house represents the sum of expenditures on
a number of bundled housing characteristics, both structural attributes, such as the
number of rooms, and less tangible characteristics including environmental quality, each
of which has its own implicit price (Brasington and Hite, 2003: 59). Houses located near
recreational parks tend to sell at higher prices than comparable houses elsewhere, owing
to the pleasure derived from beautiful views. Similarly, houses subject to olfactory
challenges created by waste water treatment plants probably sell at lower prices than
comparable houses, as pleasure is derived from avoiding such disamenities (Lesser and
others, 1997:276).
The hedonic pricing approach (HPA) is one way of measuring the contribution to
value of the different characteristics of goods (Lesser and others, 1997:276). It has been
applied to a spectrum of subjects ranging from crude oil estimation4 to valuing clean air.
Little research, however, has been done to value the benefits received from the goods or
services unique to the US DoD. In a report presented to Congressional committees in
1997, the GAO recognized that “it is important that US forces be properly equipped to
successfully achieve air superiority and that the effectiveness of this equipment be
continually modernized” (GAO/NSIAD-99-77, 1997a:29). Though the DoD is restricted
by a budget every year and is proficient in executing the fiscal dollars allocated to
modernization projects, the DoD lacks the analytical support needed for overall decisionmaking so that resources are “applied in an efficient, economical, and effective manner”
(GAO/NSIAD-99-77, 1997a:29). One tool that can be used to support recommendations
concerning force capabilities and the proper allocation and execution of fiscal dollars is
the HPA.
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The hedonic pricing function describes the relationship between an asset’s
characteristics and the price at which it sells in the market. In the case of an intangible
asset such as environmental quality, the hedonic pricing approach provides a reasonable
approximation for the value of the good or bundle of goods in question. The function can
be written in the very general form (Day and others, 2003:1):
P = P (z)

(1)

where P is market price and z is vector of characteristics. Though the form of the
hedonic pricing equation is simple, model specification, determining which
characteristics belong in the model, proves challenging. It is the responsibility of the
researcher to properly identify which characteristics belong in the model and to properly
control for variables that may influence statistical outcomes.
Other Fighter Aircraft Studies
Few studies have been conducted concerning the benefits of fighter aircraft
modernization and what the US government has been willing to pay for these benefits,
but a few studies have investigated the impact of technological advances inherent in
fighter aircraft acquisition. Two of these studies will be discussed here.
The first study, by Leroy Spearman, discusses fighter aircraft trends. He
examines fighter aircraft “in terms of performance, mission capability, effectiveness, and
cost” for the USAF, US Navy, and in some cases the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) (Spearman, 1984:1). Spearman found that, “the trends in US fighter/attack
aircraft procurement and flyaway cost from 1968 to 1982 shows a decrease in quantity
and cost immediately following Vietnam, but, since the early 1970’s the quantity of
fighter/attack aircraft accepted has been more or less constant while the flyaway cost has
4

See Wang (2003) for an article on the hedonic analysis of crude oil.
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risen significantly” (Spearman, 1984:6). The largest cost drivers for fighter aircraft were
found to be the airframe and propulsion system. He noticed that there was an “increase
in percent cost devoted to avionics—becoming about the same as that for propulsion ”
after the 1960’s (Spearman, 1984:6). When comparing US fighters to those of the USSR,
he found that US operational fighters were superior. Also, he commented that USSR
fighter aircraft tended to be more agile while those of the US were designed for increased
endurance.
The second study written by George Morehead in September 1973 applied a
performance cost estimating relationship (CER) to the study of technological change in
Navy fighter aircraft. He stated, “Since the optimal use of resources applies to both
maximization of output and minimization of cost associated problems, the Department of
Defense, and the Navy in particular, have become increasingly aware of the problems
associated with a changing technology and its effect on resource allocation” (Morehead,
1973: 8). Morehead attempted to understand the effects of technological change by
developing “a performance cost estimating relationship (CER) which when used in
conjunction with hedonic price index theory, measures technological change in the form
of a quality change index. This index is then used to adjust an index of observed price
changes, the result of which is a true price index” (Morehead, 1973: 52). This true price
index was adjusted for quality change in the performance characteristics mission speed
and payload (Morehead, 1973: 52). He then applied “the associated theory to the analysis
of price change in Navy fighter aircraft procured over a period of 1951 to 1961”
(Morehead, 1973:52). The results of his analysis showed that while procurement costs
have increased significantly, so has fighter aircraft quality. His results also indicate “new
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technology gives improved performance characteristics at lower costs than old
technology” (Morehead, 1973: 53).
Rational Public
An extensive literature has developed regarding the relationship between
public opinion and foreign policy, with much of the research coming out
of and/or focusing on American public opinion. The general consensus of
the post-World War II period regarding the relationship between public
opinion and foreign policy is referred to as the “Almond-Lippmann”
consensus. This consensus view characterized public opinion as volatile
and incoherent and, as a result, having little impact on policy outputs5.
(Carriere and others, 1999)
New theories have surfaced in recent years that have led some economists to
reject the “Almond-Lippmann” consensus6, “which implied public attitudes were
dangerously erratic, and have moved in varying degrees toward a view of public opinion
as rational” (Knopf, 1998:545). The classical view of public opinion concerning military
spending would suggest that the public reacts slowly and then overacts when faced with
foreign threats. It is believed that this is because the public does not have a good grasp of
what occurs in the larger world scheme.
The study by Jeffrey Knopf was supportive of the emerging revisionist view, that
the public could react timely and rationally when confronted with some kind of foreign
policy change. Regardless of whether the public is rational or not, the public may
influence US government decisions. As such, it is important to recognize that the
government ultimately behaves in such a way that is respectful of American ideals,
ensuring safety for its people. In this study, the price paid for USAF fighter aircraft by
the DoD reveals the preferences of the American public concerning the assurance of air
5

For more discussion concerning the “Almond-Lippmann” consensus, the reader may refer to Almond
(1950), Lippmann (1955), Cohen (1973), Morgenthau (1973).
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superiority. Though the Soviet Union, thought to be the United States’ greatest Air Force
threat, was disbanded more than a decade ago, the DoD has continued its efforts to
advance aircraft war-fighting technologies. It is assumed that the US public favors
military spending despite the lack of a visible Air Force threat.
In summary, non-market valuation methods provide inference for the demand for
goods not exchanged in a market. National defense in general, and air superiority in
particular, are just these types of non-market goods.
Since the government purchases air superiority, or a better Air Force, direct utility
to those bearing the cost of the purchase, the taxpayer, can only be inferred by assuming
that the role of utility maximizer falls to the government. This is a standard practice in
this type of research. The following chapter extends this analytical process.

6

Refer to Page and Shapiro (1992), Hurwitz and Peffley (1987), Wittkopf (1990), Hartley and Russett
(1992), Bartels (1991, Hinckley (1992) for further discussion concerning the rejection of the “AlmondLippmann” consensus.
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III. Models and Methodology

Typically the hedonic method is “applied to markets as varied as consumer
durables (e.g., automobiles and computers), agricultural commodities, labor markets, and
cultural commodities (Champ and others, 2003: 382).” This is the first stage of the
hedonic method. The second stage of hedonic demand application is concerned with
everything except traditional consumer durables analysis. This study will attempt to
estimate the demand for air superiority in a single market for USAF fighter aircraft using
a second stage approach. It will also evaluate whether or not the DoD has benefited from
continually investing in aircraft technology innovation. The aircraft used in the analysis
range from technologies as old as the F-80 to the newly equipped F-117A.
The first step in estimating the hedonic price function is to define the value to be
estimated. This is simply the US government’s willingness to pay for aircraft technology
supportive of USAF air superiority doctrine.
The second step is to collect data on aircraft value. When applying the hedonic
method to housing, sales price is often the preferred measure of value. Similarly, fighter
aircraft have a sales price. These prices are normally represented in two ways: average
unit and flyaway cost.
The Defense Acquisition Guidebook defines average unit cost as the total of all
acquisition-related appropriations divided by the total quantity of fully configured end
items and any other cost objectives established by the milestone decision authority. If
system operating and support costs are included, they are normally expressed as annual
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operating and support costs per deployable unit (e.g., squadron or battalion) or individual
system (e.g., ship), as appropriate.
Alternatively, AF Instruction (AFI) 65-503 defines the average unit flyaway cost
(equivalent to rollaway and sailaway) as those costs which relate to the production of a
usable end-item of military hardware. The following items are included in unit flyaway
cost under Appropriation 3010 (Aircraft Procurement): airframe; propulsion; electronics;
avionics; engineering change orders (ECOs); government furnished equipment (GFE);
first destination transportation (unless a separate line item); system and program
management (SE/PM) if funded by Appropriate 3010; warranties; recurring costs;
nonrecurring costs; and advance buy costs. Unit flyaway costs does not include:
research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) expenditures (Appropriation 3600);
weapons and armaments (except if part of the airframe); peculiar ground support
equipment; peculiar test equipment; technical data; and initial and replenishment spares.
In this study, unit flyaway cost is used to represent fighter aircraft value. The
reason for using this cost is because it is important that any comparisons made between
aircraft solely relate to the cost of the aircraft and not any support costs that may be tied
to each weapon system. These flyaway costs were obtained from several sources, such as
Jane’s Defense and aircraft encyclopedias covering both US and Russian airframes.
The third step in estimating the hedonic price function is to choose an appropriate
functional form. The method for choosing the dependent and independent variables are
discussed in this section. The dependent variable as mentioned earlier is unit flyaway
costs for USAF and Soviet fighter aircraft between 1946-1982. The methodologies for
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choosing the independent variables are similar to those in a study for the Naval
Postgraduate School by Robert Morehead in 1973.
Like those of Morehead’s study, descriptive aircraft parameters fall into two
categories. “The first is the group of physical characteristics which describe the aircraft
(Morehead, 1973: 24).” These characteristics are load weight and thrust. The second set
of characteristics deal with aircraft performance. Examples include maximum speed,
service ceiling, and range. Definitions concerning both physical and performance
characteristics will be briefly discussed here. Load weight was calculated by subtracting
the empty and fuel weights of an aircraft from the maximum weight. The result of this
simple calculation provides a variable that represents the payload weight an airframe is
able hold. Thrust refers to force exerted by the engine to propel the aircraft forward.
Maximum speed is simply the fastest speed an aircraft can travel, given level flight.
Service ceiling is defined as the highest altitude in which a plane can maintain a
100ft/min rate of climb. Range is the area where an aircraft operates and has power or
control before running out of fuel. Though data concerning the physical and performance
characteristics for US fighter aircraft were plentiful, models in this study were limited by
incomplete reports concerning some Soviet aircraft. When possible this study attempted
to use complete sets of data for each aircraft.
Once the data was collected, the database was normalized. Cost data adjustments
were necessary to account for the effects of inflation and inconsistencies in items
included in the flyaway costs as published in the Encyclopedia of U.S. Air Force Aircraft
and Missile Systems, Volume I. Other adjustments were made to the physical and
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performance characteristics due to unit inconsistencies, mainly metric to English
conversions such as kg to lb.
Now that the database was normalized, the analyst is able to derive mathematical
relationships. In this study a multiple regression model was used in two instances. In the
first model, US aircraft were analyzed. Only 43 data points were used in this analysis.
Two dummy variables were included in the normalized database. A potential stealth
dummy variable was added to the database such that the F-117A was the only aircraft
exhibiting stealth capability. A dummy variable for integrated circuits was also used in
this analysis. Advancements in integrated circuit technology are divided into two
categories: integrated circuits and large-scale integrated circuits. Integrated circuits were
used from 1960 to 1978 while very large-scale integrated circuit usage dates from 1979 to
present day aircraft. This dummy variable was used to approximate technological
innovation regarding avionics packages found on fighter aircraft.
The first model evaluates flyaway costs as the dependent variable versus thrust,
service ceiling, range, integrated circuits, and large-scale integrated circuits as
independent variables.
Originally the model took on a linear functional form:
P = 0 + 1 x1 + 2 x2 + 3 x3 + 4 x4+ 5 x5 + e

(2)

where P is flyaway cost, 0 is the intercept, x1 is thrust, x2 is service ceiling, x3 is range,
x4 is integrated circuits, x5 is large-scale integrated circuits, and e is stochastic error. It
was expected that each of these independent variables highly influence aircraft costs.
Literature suggests that in choosing a functional form using the hedonic method
that linear functions are not usually appropriate. Semi-log functional forms are often
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used instead (Champ and others, 2003: 339). Furthermore, “the semi-log allows for
incremental changes in characteristics to have a constant effect on the percentage change
in price and non-linear relationship on the price level (Champ and others, 2003:357).” As
such a non-linear regression model was used:
Pˆ = 0 + 1 x1 + 2 x2 + 3 x3 + 4 x4+ 5 x5 + e

(3)

where Pˆ is ln(flyaway cost), 0 is the intercept, x1 is thrust, x2 is service ceiling, x3 is
range, x4 is integrated circuits, x5 is large-scale integrated circuits, and e is stochastic
error. Another non-linear model was used:
A second database was created to compare US and Soviet fighter aircraft
characteristics. Like the original database, physical and performance data for each
aircraft were compiled. Only here US aircraft were matched with an enemy aircraft. The
aircraft matches were based on two principles. First, historical literature was used to
support the matching of aircraft. For example, certain airframes like F-15E were
designed to combat the threat fighter Su-34. Not all Soviet fighter aircraft were included
in the database. The main reason for this is that some Soviet planes were not designed to
combat USAF planes. In some instances, the Soviets designed planes to combat Naval
aircraft such as the TU-28P whose comparable US aircraft was the F-14. In other
instances, the Soviet aircraft never became operational. An example is the Yak-23. US
intelligence was able to evaluate the Yak-23 after acquiring one airframe. Shortly after
this incidence, Yak-23s were withdrawn from production lines. Second, aircraft matches
were made with aircraft variants that were fielded approximately in the same time frame.
Each US variant was matched with a Soviet plane that had similar mission objectives,
characteristics, and was fielded either shortly before or after the combatant plane. Once

23

all the Soviet fighter aircraft were matched with a US equivalent, calculations were done
for each variable. For example, in the case of the F-104A versus the MiG-21, the thrust
variable was calculated:
T = UT - ST

(4)

where T is engine thrust, UT is US fighter aircraft thrust, and ST is Soviet Union fighter
aircraft thrust. Similar calculations were done for each matched aircraft and variable
category. This database was used to conduct another linear regression. The functional
form for this regression model is as follows:
Pˆ = 0 + 1 x1 + 2 x2 + 3 x3 + 4 x4+ 5 x5 + e

(5)

where Pˆ is ln(flyaway cost), 0 is the intercept, x1 is thrust, x2 is load weight, x3 is
maximum speed, x4 is service ceiling, x5 is range, and e is stochastic error. The analysis
for all these regression models will be discussed in the next section. The databases,
matches, and unit conversions can be found in Appendix B.
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IV. Model Evaluation and Analysis

Two models were used in this study7. The first model was restricted to USAF
fighter aircraft and their corresponding physical and performance characteristics. A
multiple regression estimation method was used to estimate the coefficients of the
independent variables in the following general non-linear equation:
Pˆ = 0 + 1 x1 + 2 x2 + 3 x3 + 4 x4+ 5 x5 + e

(3)

where Pˆ is ln(flyaway cost), 0 is the intercept, x1 is thrust, x2 is service ceiling, x3 is
range, x4 is integrated circuits, x5 is large-scale integrated circuits, and e is stochastic
error. Summary statistics of selected variables appear in Table 2:
Table 2. US Fighter Aircraft Summary Statistics
Mean

Max

Min

Std. Dev.

Engine Thrust (lbf)

13286.74

24500

1600

7986.331

Service Ceiling (ft)

49469.3

64795

36800

6700.3

Range (miles)

1832.07

3178

540

581.2592

Integrated Circuits

0.4418605

1

0

0.6287677

Large-Scale Integrated Circuits

0.1627907

1

0

0.3735437

A linear functional form for the hedonic price function is not usually appropriate.
Therefore, a semi-log functional form was used for ease in interpreting coefficients. Here
 indicates a percentage change in flyaway cost due to xi.
The regression estimates are contained in Table 3.

7

The independence of the right hand side variables used in both models may not be clear, possibly due to
signaling between both countries or human intelligence providing information about threat aircraft.
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Table 3. US Fighter Aircraft Regression Estimates
Coefficient

Robust Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

Intercept

10.06084

0.5747992

17.50

0.000

Engine Thrust

0.0001013

0.000019

5.32

0.000

Service Ceiling

0.0000465

0.0000124

3.74

0.001

Range

0.0005569

0.0001922

2.90

0.006

Integrated Circuits

0.1920676

0.2556311

0.75

0.457

Large Scale Integrated Circuits

0.7378995

0.3189841

2.31

0.026

R-squared

0.9121

F-statistic

113.45

Prob > F

0.0000

This model was regressed using Huber-White estimators to obtain better tests and
confidence intervals to correct for asymptotic standard errors (Maas and Hox, 2004:129).
There are several assumptions made in evaluating regression model relationships.
The first is ensuring the model is specified correctly. An omission of relevant
independent variables or inclusion of irrelevant variables can create bias. Economic
theory should be available to defend the use of explanatory variables in the model. For
the purposes of this study, all physical and performance characteristics are measurable
items regularly found in literature concerning fighter aircraft. The RESET test was used
to identify if an explanatory variable may have been omitted due to model
misspecification (Ramsey, 1979). The RESET test resulted in failure to reject the null
hypothesis that the model is specified correctly.
The second assumption that many researchers believe must be satisfied is the
assumption that errors are normally, identically, and independently distributed. Several
residual plots were investigated to ensure this assumption was met. These residual plots

26

can be found in the appendix. Also, the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality resulted in an
insignificant p-value such that the null hypothesis could not be rejected. Therefore, there
is no significant evidence to conclude that the residuals are not normally distributed.
A third assumption is the homogeneity of error variance. Any possible
heteroskedasticity was detected using a graphical method where residuals were plotted
against the fitted values. The residual plot indicated that the assumption could be
accepted. Furthermore, the Breusch-Pagan test resulted in a p-value that was not
significant. Thus, there is no significant evidence to conclude that the variance of the
residuals is not homogeneous.
The fourth and last assumption that must be satisfied is that predictors are not
collinear. Multicollinearity issues can cause problems with coefficient estimates. More
specifically, regression model estimates of the coefficients may be unstable and their
standard errors inflated. The variance inflation factor (VIF) test was used to detect
multicollinearity issues. The VIF table can be found in the appendix. Typically a VIF
value greater than 10 can merit further investigation. The VIF values did not prove
worrisome. Additionally, the Hausman test showed no signs of endogeneity issues. This
is also often interpreted as a specification test, pointing to robustness in the estimates.
Now that all the assumptions associated with the multiple regression estimation model
has been satisfied, the researcher can conduct a statistical evaluation.
According to the F-statistic, the overall model is significant. The coefficient of
determination, R2, is 0.9121, which means that the resulting model explains
approximately 91 percent of the variability in flyaway costs for 43 USAF fighter aircraft.
The intercept and four variables used in the model were statistically significant. The

27

explanatory variable coefficients were all positively related to flyaway costs. For
example, a unit increase in range would yield a 0.06 percent increase in flyaway costs.
The percentage change in flyaway cost due to large-scale integrated circuits is the highest
coefficient value overall8. This indicates that it is the greatest cost driver found in USAF
fighter aircraft. It is not surprising that the dummy variable used to represent
advancement in avionics had the greatest impact on the flyaway cost for USAF fighter
aircraft. In a study done by M.L. Spearman in 1984 concerning fighter aircraft trends, he
stated “the airframe is shown to be the largest cost factor, averaging about 60 percent of
the total flyaway costs over the years. The second largest cost contributor is generally the
propulsion system.” He later states that avionics was becoming a large cost factor that
would match that would later match that of propulsion. It seems many changes have
come about since the dawn of integrated circuit technology in the 1960’s such that
integrated circuitry is the greatest contributing cost factor, far surpassing the impact of
propulsion technology.
The second model compared USAF and Soviet fighter aircraft physical and
performance characteristics. For example, the SU-30MKI was designed to combat the F15E. The F-15E took its first flight in 1986, followed almost a decade later by the SU-30
MKI, taking its first flight in 1994. Both aircraft were designed as dual-seater, multi-role
tactical fighters. Though the F-15E is faster and has greater range, the SU-30MKI
exhibits a more powerful propulsion system, heavier weapons payload capability, and
higher service ceiling. The remaining USAF and Soviet fighter aircraft were matched in
a similar manner.

8

The coefficient for this ordinal variable is difficult to interpret but still yields the highest value indicating
it is the largest cost factor in the model.

28

Figure 5. SU-30MKI Line Drawing

Figure 6. F-15E Line Drawing

In this model the general form for the equation is as follows:
Pˆ = 0 + 1 x1 + 2 x2 + 3 x3 + 4 x4+ 5 x5 + e

where Pˆ is ln(flyaway cost), 0 is the intercept, x1 is thrust, x2 is load weight, x3 is
maximum speed, x4 is service ceiling, x5 is range, and e is stochastic error. Summary
statistics of these selected variables appear in Table 4.
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(5)

Table 4. US versus USSR Fighter Aircraft Summary Statistics
Mean

Max

Min

Std. Dev.

 Engine Thrust

572.2296

8763.69

-7085

3852.689

 Payload Weight

2331.237

17343

-17658.17

8917.554

 Maximum Speed

33.2288

620

-742.41

317.7751

 Service Ceiling

-3868.4

8800

-19300

6180.04

709.3576

1628

-387

578.0983

 Range

The regression estimates for this model are contained in Table 5.
Table 5. US versus USSR Fighter Aircraft Regression Estimates
Coefficient

Robust Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

14.4557

0.5807653

24.89

0.000

Engine Thrust

-0.0000776

0.0000769

-1.01

0.325

Payload Weight

-0.000035

0.0000306

-1.14

0.268

Maximum Speed

0.0011686

0.0005476

2.13

0.046

Service Ceiling

-0.0000996

0.0000438

-2.28

0.035

Range

0.0007369

0.0005638

1.31

0.207

Intercept

R-squared

0.2913

F-statistic

4.23

Prob > F

0.0094

This model was also regressed using Huber-White estimators.
Again, the Ramsey RESET test was done to ensure relevant explanatory variables
were not excluded and irrelevant explanatory variables were not included in the model.
The results of the RESET test showed that the null hypothesis could not be rejected.
Therefore there is not enough evidence to suggest the model was subject to omitted
variable bias.
The other assumptions made in evaluating the regression model relationships are
that errors are normally, identically, and independently distributed; homogeneous error
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variance; and that predictors are not collinear. It may be difficult to meet these
assumptions given a rather small sample size of 25 observations. Nevertheless, these
assumptions must be satisfied before the researcher can interpret coefficients or conduct
further analysis. The residual plots were investigated to ensure the errors were normally,
identically, and independently distributed. By means of visual inspection it appears the
residual plots support the normality assumption. The Shapiro-Wilk test also supports this
conclusion, as the null hypothesis could not be rejected. A plot of fitted values versus
residuals allowed for a visual inspection of possible heteroskedasticity. The BreuschPagan test resulted in a p-value that was not significant indicating there is not enough
evidence to reject the null hypothesis. The VIF test was then conducted to check for
possible multicollinearity issues. All VIF values were less than two indicating that there
is no multicollinearity problems associated with this set of variables. The final test
checked for endogenity. The Hausman test showed that endogenity and misspecification
were not issues.
Now that all the assumptions were satisfied, analysis was conducted on this
comparative model. The overall model is statistically significant such that it explains
approximately 29 percent of the variability in flyaway costs of USAF versus Soviet
fighter aircraft. Along with the intercept -- maximum speed and service ceiling variables
were statistically significant. However, the service ceiling variable coefficient was found
unexpectedly negative. This may be due to the fact that Soviet fighter aircraft had
significantly higher service ceiling thresholds while USAF fighter aircraft were able to
maintain level flight acceleration better than their Soviet counterparts. This seems to be
contrary to some of Spearman’s findings. He claimed that US operational fighters were
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superior to those of the USSR. This may not be the case. He also found that USSR
fighter aircraft were faster than comparable US aircraft. This analysis shows that US
aircraft can achieve greater speeds.
In any case, it seems all the coefficients were rather small. As such, it is possible
that USAF fighter aircraft are not necessarily that much better than Soviet aircraft strictly
in terms of physical and performance characteristics. In looking strictly at the summary
statistics it appears that US fighter aircraft are better on average in regards to these
physical and performance characteristics. However, the large standard deviations
associated with these characteristics merit further investigation. Several t-Tests were
conducted to see if there were any differences between aircraft based on these
characteristics. The results are found in Table 6 below.
Table 6. US versus USSR Fighter Two-Tailed t-Test Results
Thrust

Payload Weight

Maximum Speed

Service Ceiling

Range

t-Test Statistic

0.2502

0.8034

0.2689

-1.7563

9.2832

Lower Critical Value

-2.0106

-2.0167

-2.0106

-2.0106

-2.0106

Upper Critical Value

2.0106

2.0167

2.0106

2.0106

2.0106

p-Value

0.8035

0.4262

0.7891

0.0854

0.0000

The results of the t-Tests showed that on average there is no difference in regards
to thrust, payload weight, and maximum speed when comparing US and USSR fighter
aircraft. However, based on additional one-tailed t-Tests, the results show that USSR
fighter aircraft can attain higher service ceilings while those of the US exhibit greater
range on average. The results for the one-tailed t-Tests are found in Table 7.
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Table 7. US versus USSR Fighter One Tailed t-Test Results
Service Ceiling

Range

t-Test Statistic

-1.756309872

3.852368926

Critical Value

-1.677224197

1.677224197

p-Value

0.042707066

0.000173277

These results suggest that the US government is paying for physical and
performance characteristics but not necessarily paying to have relative advantage over the
threat. If USAF fighter aircraft are not relatively superior to those procured by the former
USSR strictly by means of physical and performance characteristics, there must be some
other unknown quality that has not been captured. Identifying this unknown quality that
separates USAF fighter aircraft from rivals is a possible area for further research.

33

V. Conclusion

As the United States continues to assess emerging threats and forge appropriate
responses, understanding the nations’ historical demand for air superiority is critical.
This study attempted to answer two questions to assist decision makers in planning for
the future of the USAF fighter aircraft fleet: (1) What is the US government’s revealed
preference for ensuring air dominance? (2) Has the US government purchased fighter
aircraft that are inferior, superior, or comparable to threat technologies, namely the
former Soviet Union?
In comparing strictly US aircraft, my analysis suggest that the US government has
been willing to pay a great deal for aircraft innovation in the areas of avionics, higher
service ceiling, greater range, and superior propulsion systems. The US appears to find
such advancements necessary as a new, fifth generation of fighter aircraft are currently
tested and fielded.
However, when historically comparing US fighter aircraft against those of the
former Soviet Union, I find that expenditures are not strongly linked to relative
technological superiority. Simple comparative analysis of the data reveal that the US
government is paying for characteristics that are absolute and not to have a relative
advantage over the threat. This research suggests that based on the characteristics
analyzed, there is not much difference between US and USSR fighter aircraft. However,
it could be that the USAF fighter aircraft have better avionics packages or more precise
missiles and bombs. These are areas that merit further investigation.
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These findings are important primarily for what they do not find, rather than what
they do find. Since the US government is not displaying a revealed preference for a
fighter aircraft relatively more advanced than the dominant foe – at least within the
context of these measurable characteristics – then our historical air superiority is based on
some other factor. These results suggest that there is some embedded characteristic in
fighter aircraft technology, some unobservable schema that generates air superiority that
the US has enjoyed for over fifty years. If, by chance, through process of elimination, it
is determined that none of the physical and performance characteristics associated with
fighter aircraft matter, then there is evidence to suggest that it is the human factor that
makes the difference.
It is likely that the embedded characteristics of fighter aircraft that generates air
superiority supports in the investment of human capital or air and ground crews, and their
command and control. This could be in the form of better pilot and navigator training or
maintenance crews, or something that benefits command and control. This research lays
aside the mistaken, but widely shared belief that our aircraft are demonstrably better than
those of our enemy, at least in respect to the characteristics outlined in this study. If the
US government is not paying for a better AF by means of a fleet of fighter aircraft with
physical and performance characteristics that surpass those of combatants, there are some
qualities the government displays a revealed preference for that remain unknown and
should be identified.
It could be that Spearman is correct in his assertion that the US has been paying
for fighter aircraft to endure decades of service. His claim has yet to be empirically
justified. I recommend follow-on empirical research that identifies human factor
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differences between US and their enemy air and ground crews, the relative frequency and
intensity of training, the effectiveness of joint and combined training on US forces and
the role ground training and pilot selection plays in overall air superiority. These are just
a few areas that warrant further research. However, the most clear expression of the role
of non-technical factors in air superiority is provided by former Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering, Dr. Malcolm Currie:
In this increasingly competitive, often hostile and rapidly changing world,
Americans seem to have only one real choice. Clearly our national wellbeing cannot be based on unlimited raw materials or on unlimited
manpower and cheap labor. Rather it must be based on our ability to
multiply and enhance the limited natural and human resources we do have.
Technology thus appears to offer us our place in the sun – the means to
insure our security and economic vitality. (Westenhoff, 1990:85)
His assessment of the current war-fighting environment is correct. The US is
faced with the challenge of continuing operations given limited resources and manpower.
In this age technology may be only a piece of what is required to buy a better Air Force.
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Appendix B: Databases

Table 8. Model 1 Database
popularname
Shooting Star
Shooting Star
Shooting Star
Twin-Mustang
Twin-Mustang
Thunderjet
Thunderjet
Thunderjet
Thunderjet
Sabre
Starfire
Thunderjet
Scorpion
Starfire
Scorpion
Sabre
Starfire
Thunderstreak
Sabre
Super Sabre
Super Sabre
Delta Dagger
Super Sabre
Voodoo
Voodoo
Starfighter
Starfighter
Delta Dart
Delta Dart
Thunderchief
Starfighter
Thunderchief
Phantom II
Phantom II
Phantom II
Aardvark
Eagle
Eagle
Eagle
Eagle
Fighting Falcon
Fighting Falcon
Strike Eagle

model
F-80 A
F-80 B
F-80 C
F-82 E
F-82 F
F-84 B
F-84 C
F-84 D
F-84 E
F-86 A
F-94 A
F-84 G
F-89 A/B
F-94 B
F-89 C
F-86 F
F-94 C
F-84 F
F-86 H
F-100 A
F-100 C
F-102 A
F-100 D
F-101 A
F-101 C
F-104 A
F-104 C
F-106 A
F-106 B
F-105 D
F-104 G
F-105 F
F-4 C
F-4 D
F-4 E
F-111 B
F-15 A
F-15 B
F-15 C
F-15 D
F-16 A
F-16 C
F-15 E

year powerplantthrustlbst loadweightlb maxspeedmph serviceceilingft rangemiles lnflyawaycost
1945
4000
5855
558
45000
540
12.50191
1947
4500
7069
577
36800
1210
12.50191
1948
4600
7861
580
42750
1380
12.48552
1948
1600
8754
465
40000
2708
13.31939
1948
1600
8703
460
38700
2400
13.31939
1948
3750
9365
587
40750
1282
13.60545
1948
3750
9350
587
40600
1274
12.94321
1949
3750
9430
587
39300
1198
13.30575
1949
4900
10351
619
43220
2057
13.30575
1949
5200
5108
679
48000
1052
13.13211
1950
4600
5125
606
49750
1079
13.50147
1951
5600
11068
622
42100
2000
13.41713
1951
6800
16765
642
51400
1300
14.93818
1951
6000
6002
588
48000
905
13.22741
1952
7400
11219
650
50500
905
14.62914
1952
5910
8392
695
48000
1615
13.30042
1953
8750
10150
640
51400
1275
14.22857
1954
7200
10102
685
44300
2314
14.59355
1954
8920
9258
692
50800
1810
14.31535
1954
14800
9420
852
51000
1294
14.87059
1955
16000
14287
925
49100
1954
14.44508
1956
16000
10411
780
53400
1492
15.03811
1956
16000
14347
910
47700
1995
14.49486
1957
15000
18396
1005
49450
2186
15.92269
1957
15000
21343
1004
49000
2125
15.09963
1958
14800
10785
1324
64795
1585
15.38642
1958
15800
13466
1324
58000
1727
15.26125
1960
24500
11504
1328
52700
1809
16.40335
1960
24500
14858
1328
51450
1842
16.44502
1960
24500
19806
1373
48500
2208
15.61659
1962
15800
13294
1328
46300
1875
15.20644
1963
24500
23885
890
48500
2228
15.64424
1963
17000
27256
1433
56100
1926
15.49764
1966
17000
27193
1432
55850
1844
15.38642
1967
17900
28783
1464
59600
1885
15.73126
1968
18500
27283
1450
44900
3178
17.01911
1972
23480
22783
1650
63350
2720
17.26103
1972
23480
22783
1650
63350
2720
17.26103
1972
23450
25163
1543
56440
2469
17.33026
1972
23450
25163
1543
56440
2469
17.33026
1979
23820
16906
1346
47435
2385
16.61343
1979
23770
16509
1278
52450
2159
16.86626
1986
23450
43705
1875
50000
2400
17.36961

ic lsic
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1

Table 9. Model 2 Database
model
F-104A vs. MiG-21
F-86F vs. MiG-15
F-4D vs. MiG-231
F-86A vs. La-15
F-80A vs. MiG-9
F-100A vs. MiG-19
F-80A vs. Yak-15
F-80B vs. Yak-17
F-111B vs. Su-24
F-101C vs. Yak-28P
F-15D vs. Su-47
F-104A vs. Mig-21
F-102A vs. Su-9
F-100C vs. Su-7
F-104G vs. Su-15
F-106A vs. Su-152
F-15D vs. Su-27
F-16C vs. Su-37
F-89A/B vs. Yak-25
F-4D vs. MiG-23
F-15A vs. MiG-25
F-15D vs. MiG-31
F-86F vs. MiG-17
F-16A vs. Mig-29
F-15E vs. Su-30MKI

lnflyawaycost powerplantthrustlbst loadweightlb maxspeedmph serviceceilingft rangemiles
15.39
-936.31
3385
-61
2495
1305
13.3
-272.12
5217.46
42.56
-1900
885
15.39
-1793.65
12908
-121
-4845
1272
13.13
1693.05
2295
41
5350
322
12.5
2236.34
2454
21
2350
40
14.87
7628.74
4414
137
-6415
-81
12.5
1999.24
4276
123
1200
223
12.5
2499.24
5285.64
109
-5020
963
17.02
1639.67
-2727
620
8800
1628
15.1
4659
17343
254
-6000
575
17.33
4701.31
10573
-7
-4260
1539
15.39
-936.31
3385
-61
2495
1275
15.04
-4232.4
2411
-742.41
-1600
1152
14.45
578.42
6217
210
-600
1054
15.21
-2278.77
594
-575.02
-19300
475
16.4
8763.69
900
1
-12300
896
17.33
-4155.98
10573
-7
-4260
49
16.87
-7085
-17658.17
-272
-6605
-71
14.94
1696.94
10150
-38
1400
-387
15.39
-1793.65
13734
594
-4845
92
17.26
-1248.48
-14087
-215
-4565
1111
17.33
2543.19
-17137
613
-11160
419
13.3
-47.32
-3386
-16
-6500
945
16.61
4396.9
4156
-172
-11625
585
17.37
-5950
-6995
352.59
-9000
1467.94
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